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Abstract: Increasing private wildfire risk mitigation is an important part of the larger
forest restoration policy challenge. Data from an economic experiment are used to
evaluate the effectiveness of providing fuel treatments on public land adjacent to private
land to induce private wildfire risk mitigation. Results show evidence of “crowding out”
where public spending can decrease the level of private risk mitigation. However, a
policy prescription that ameliorates this crowding out is identified. Participants undertake
more mitigation when fuel treatments on publicly owned lands are conditional on a
threshold level of private mitigation effort and information describing each participant’s
spending is provided.
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I. Introduction
Responding to increasing wildfire risk is an important policy challenge in the
Western U.S. and elsewhere (Donovan and Brown 2005). Defined as “the area where
houses meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland vegetation,” the wildland-urban
interface (WUI) is an area of particular significance (Hammer et al. 2008, pg. 5). Land
ownership in the WUI commonly follows a mosaic pattern, where the intermixed public
and private land make wildfire risk a collective problem. Referred to as the “mitigation
paradox” (Steelman 2007), private landowners and communities frequently fail to
undertake sufficient wildfire risk mitigation. The objective of this paper is to use the
tools of experimental economics to help design and explore policy packages for
confronting the mitigation paradox, and inducing increased private risk mitigation.
Surveys of homeowners indicate that conditions on adjacent properties are an
important consideration in mitigation decisions (Brenkert, Champ, and Flores 2005).
WUI homeowners recognize the threat of wildfire as a collective problem. Forest
management regimes are increasingly accounting for this by providing risk mitigation on
publically owned lands adjacent to privately owned lands (U.S. Congress 2000; U.S.
Congress 2009). The effectiveness of these types of policies to induce additional private
risk mitigation is unclear and motivates this research.
Data from a computerized laboratory experiment (with 244 participants and 2,490
choices) are used to explore the potential response of WUI homeowners to the
introduction of policy tools. The experimental design builds on a number of recent
studies (McKee et al. 2004; Talberth et al. 2006; Berrens et al. 2007) with the current
focus on two potential policies that recognize the prevalent public-private land mosaic in
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the WUI: (i) a policy where wildfire risk mitigation takes place on surrounding public
land; and (ii) a policy where mitigation on surrounding public land takes place only if a
threshold number of individuals have undertaken fuel reductions. The modeling of
participants’ mitigation decisions controls for risk aversion and social trust, as well as
information provision. In creating a total of six treatment cells, the two policy treatments
are compared against a no action baseline case, and then all three settings are evaluated
with and without the provision of information on the risk mitigation behavior of other
participants.
Results indicate that public spending can have the unintended effect of decreasing
the amount of private risk mitigation. However, a policy prescription that ameliorates this
crowding out is identified. A policy of providing fuel treatments on public land
conditional on a threshold of private risk mitigation while simultaneously disseminating
collective information describing each participant’s effort is shown to increase participant
spending on wildfire risk mitigation.

II. Background and Motivation
The wildfire problem in the Western U.S. and elsewhere is worsening due to a
combination of natural and human factors. The WUI is expanding. During the 1990s, the
WUI grew in area by 19% and in number of households by 22%, such that in 2000, the
WUI represented 11% of the total land area (715,000 km2) and 38% of all housing units
(44.3 million) for the coterminous US (Hammer et al. 2008). Fuel loads have also grown
as wildfire has been increasingly suppressed in effort to protect homes situated in the
WUI (Kovacs 2001; Donovan and Brown 2005). Combined with long-term drought and
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accumulating fuel loads the expansion of the WUI has significantly increased the risk of
high intensity fires (USDA 2003; Donovan and Brown 2005; Westerling et al. 2006).
As a result, large wildfires are occurring more often and are burning an expanding
area. On USDA Forest Service lands for example, average annual acres burned increased
from 285,000 from 1970-1986 to 1,000,000 from 1987-2002 (Calkin et al. 2005). The
pecuniary costs of wildfire are also rising; annual federal appropriations in the US for
wildland fire management activities have increased from an average of $1.2 billion from
fiscal years 1996-2000 to an average of $2.9 billion during fiscal years 2001-2007
(Nazzaro 2009). Suppression costs typically account for more than 60 percent of the
annual federal costs of wildfire management activities and are growing as well (US
Government Accountability Office 2007). These rising costs combined with the
recognition of wildfire as natural and beneficial process have lead to growing sentiment
that a suppression-centered wildfire policy is unwise (Franklin and Agee 2003; Berry
2007; Donovan and Brown 2007).
Moving away from a costly policy focus on suppression requires the reintroduction of natural fire regimes at a landscape scale (Franklin and Agee 2003;
Donovan and Brown 2007), while also targeting fuel treatment and risk mitigation efforts
to protect at-risk WUI communities (Harbour et al. 2009). These risk-mitigating efforts
include: reducing the volume of fuel in an area, using flame resistant building materials,
applying flame retardants, creating strategic breaks in fuel sources, and removing ladder
fuels that facilitate fires spreading into the forest canopy (Murnane 2006). Because
mitigation can potentially reduce suppression costs in the WUI as well as avoid aesthetic
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costs associated with wildfire, a change in priorities is underway, increasing the focus on
these types of preventative actions (O’Toole 2006; USDA 2006).
Though fuel treatments on public lands are ongoing as a part of the National Fire
Plan (USDA and US Department of Interior 2000) and Healthy Forest Restoration Act of
2003 (U.S. Congress 2003), wildfire risk mitigation by government alone is insufficient
on three counts. First, a significant amount of forested land (58% in the U.S.) is privately
owned (Smith et al. 2004). Second, the scope of wildfire is such that there is simply too
much land in need of fuel reductions to be paid for with public funds alone. Recent
analyses find that nearly 400 million acres of forestland across the U.S. are characterized
as either of “moderate” or “high” risk of catastrophic fire (Power 2006). Juxtaposed
against these 400 million acres in need of treatment, the federal government has financed
treatments on less than 3 million acres in recent years (Power 2006). Third, inefficient
levels of wildfire risk mitigation are expected from individuals in the WUI because of the
risk externalities associated with fuel treatments (Crowley et al. 2009). Here, risk
externalities (sometimes called adjacency externalities) describe the wildfire
characteristic of risk being shared across property lines, and that actions taken to mitigate
wildfire risk on one property concurrently reduce the risk of fire in the surrounding area
(Konoshima 2008). In this way, wildfire risk mitigation can be thought of as a public
good (Busby et al. 2007). Termed the “mitigation paradox,” (Steelman 2007) the
behavior of individuals confronting shared wildfire risk is consistent with theoretical
predictions; private individuals do not undertake a sufficient level of wildfire risk
mitigation. This suggests a potential role for policy to induce WUI homeowners to
undertake risk mitigation.
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In practice, a varied set of policy responses are being implemented, including
subsidizing private spending on fuel treatments1, enacting legislation that marries
insurance availability and premiums to risk mitigating behavior (Wallace 2005), and
providing education about wildfire risk and fuel treatments (Sturtevant and McCaffrey
2006). This paper focuses on the effectiveness of a specific approach: providing wildfire
risk mitigation on public lands that are adjacent to privately owned lands.
A number of collaborative, community-forestry-based management programs
have been implemented that fund risk mitigation on public lands that are adjacent to
private lands. One notable example is the ongoing federal Collaborative Forest
Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico, and potentially at a broader national level
the recently-enacted Forest Landscape Restoration Program (FLRP) (U.S. Congress
2000; U.S. Congress 2009). One rationale underlying these programs is that landowners
mitigation decisions are increasingly thought to be influenced by the extent of risk
mitigation taking place in the surrounding area (Brenkert, Champ, and Flores 2005;
Martin et al. 2007). While evaluation of the effectiveness of collaborative, community
forest management programs has begun (American Forests et al. 2005; Prante et al.
2007), the potential of fuel reductions on public lands to generate wildfire risk mitigation
on adjacent private lands remains largely unknown.
The issue of how to induce private wildfire risk mitigation is attracting increasing
attention from researchers. Two lines of work are particularly relevant here: one set of
analyses have addressed the issue with theoretical models and the use of numerical
simulation (Amacher et al. 2005; Lankoande 2005; Amacher et al. 2006; Shafran 2008a;
Crowley et al. 2009), and a second set of studies making use of laboratory experiments
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(McKee et al. 2004; Talberth et al. 2006; Berrens et al. 2007; Shafran 2008b). Evidence
from both lines of research suggests that policy can be effective in inducing private risk
mitigation. However, this is tempered by the observation of policy in some instances
crowding out private risk mitigation (McKee et al. 2004; Berrens et al. 2007; Crowley et
al. 2009). Although the overall objective of increasing private spending on wildfire risk
mitigation remains, identifying policy tools that ameliorate crowding out while also
providing public spending on wildfire risk mitigation emerges as another objective.

III. Experiment Design
This section describes the experiment. The experiment took place during the Fall
2007, Spring 2008, and Fall 2008 semesters at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
Undergraduate student were recruited from across the university as subjects. Upon
entering the lab, each subject was randomly assigned a workstation in a carrel consisting
of a networked laptop computer, a preamble providing background information on
homeowners living in the WUI, and a satellite photo showing an example home situated
in the WUI. The experiment began with the proctor reading the preamble aloud as
subjects followed along with their hard copies. Once the proctor finished reading the
preamble, participants were asked to follow the instructions on their laptops.2
Groups of 12 subjects participated in each session. To mirror the relevant features
of an environment with intermixed publicly and privately owned land, the 12 participants
each represented a WUI homeowner and there were 4 additional parcels of publically
owned land. Risk mitigation on these publicly owned parcels was controlled by the
experimenter to simulate the policy tools evaluated.
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Sessions proceeded as follows. Each participant was endowed with an asset,
called their “home asset.” Participants earned an income stream in each round based on
the value of their “home asset.” A random draw took place at the end of each round to
determine whether the group experienced a wildfire event. If a wildfire event occurred,
each participant’s home asset decreased in value, thus reducing a participant’s income
stream in future rounds. However, participants could engage in activities that reduced risk
exposure, and consequently reduced financial consequences of a wildfire event. Sessions
lasted 12 rounds but subjects were not informed of the end point.3 Subjects allocated
income earned from their “home asset” among three goods in each round.
The first good available to participants was named “Mitigation,” and was intended
to represent expenditures on real world risk mitigating processes such as fuel reductions.
There are two benefits from the good “Mitigation.” First, spending on this good reduces
the probability that the group experienced a wildfire event. Second, spending on
“Mitigation” reduced the magnitude of the loss participants experienced if a wildfire
event occurred. As noted earlier, wildfire risk mitigation in real world situations generate
positive externalities. The good “Mitigation” in the experiment is therefore created such
that the benefit of a lab dollar spent on the good is accrued not only by the individual
spending that lab dollar, but to the group as a whole.
The second good available to participants was called “Insurance,” and was
intended as a proxy for real world spending on insurance. When a participant spent a lab
dollar on “Insurance”, they were reimbursed if a wildfire event occurred. Unlike
mitigation, the benefit a participant receives from purchasing insurance does not depend
on the spending behavior of the rest of the group. For every $LAB a participant spends
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on “Insurance,” $LAB 16 are added back to the value of their home asset if a fire occurs.
Insurance purchases are only good for the current round.
The final good participants chose among was called “Savings.” A subject’s
spending on “Savings” did not impact wildfire behavior in the experiment but instead is
the principle mechanism by which subjects earned payment for their participation in the
experiment. At the conclusion of the experiment, each $LAB that a participant spent on
“Savings” is converted into American dollars and awarded to the subject (in cash).4 The
behavior of interest is how participants distributed the income they earned each round
among “Mitigation,” “Insurance,” and “Savings” as experimental treatments were
introduced.
Wildfire events in the experiment were designed to follow the properties of
wildfire in the WUI. Risk mitigation has the potential to reduce the intensity of a fire by
reducing the amount of available fuel to burn (Kovacs 2001). Fuel reductions can also
reduce wildfire intensity by inhibiting the spread into the forest canopy where fuel is
abundant (USDA 2003). Homeowner’s risk exposure is thought to be determined not
only by the conditions on their property, but also by the conditions of the surrounding
landscape (Finney 2006; Scott 2006). Similarly, the benefits of mitigation not only
accrue to the individual but by everyone in the vicinity; mitigation generates a positive
externality for the surrounding area. Further, because wildfire risk is shared, the
effectiveness of risk mitigation also depends upon the conditions on surrounding lands
(Shafran 2008a). Though weather and topography cannot be altered by mitigation,
reducing fuel loads provides homeowners a way to slow the spread of wildfire (van
Wagtendonk 1996; Finney 2001).

10

In the experiment, the probability of a wildfire events is modeled as a function of
the sum of all participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round, the number of
participants engaging in mitigation, and the number of rounds that have elapsed since the
previous wildfire event (this simulates fuel accumulation in the absence of wildfire). For
the experiment, this was parameterized with the following function:
N / 48
⎛
⎞
−GMIT / 6000 ⎟
⎝ 1 + 60e
⎠

π = 0.4 + ( RE * 0.01) − ⎜

(1)

where π is the probability of a wildfire event occurring, RE is the rounds elapsed since
the last wildfire event, N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum
of all participants spending on “Mitigation” in the round.5
The process is complex and, of course, the participants do not directly observe
equation (1). Instead, via the computer interface, subjects can see how much each lab
dollar spent on mitigation will reduce risk exposure through trial and error with two
“sliders.” Subjects drag scrollbars representing the number of participants undertaking
risk mitigation and the level of mitigation undertaken by the group, respectively. As
participants change their conjecture regarding the group decisions, the projected
probability of wildfire and potential losses presented at the bottom right corner of the
screen change. Through the use of these sliders the process of wildfire risk mitigation
that is characterized by equation (1) is presented. 6
As with wildfire probability, the severity of the loss in value of their home assets
in the event of a wildfire is determined by the sum of all participants spending on
“Mitigation” in the round and the number of participants engaging in mitigation. If a
wildfire event takes place in a round, equation (2) is used to determine event severity:
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N / 24
⎛
⎞
LOSS = 0.71 − ⎜
−GMIT / 3600 ⎟
⎝ 1 + 36e
⎠

(2)

LOSS is the proportion of a participant’s home asset value that is lost due to the wildfire,
N is the number of participants mitigating, and GMIT is the sum of all participants
spending on “Mitigation” in the round. As before, participants use the sliders to form
estimates of how spending on “Mitigation” and the number of participants undertaking
mitigation will reduce the severity of a potential loss.

Vr +1 = Vr − (Vr * LOSS + INS i *16)

(3)

Where Vr +1 is the value of a participant’s home asset in round r + 1 , Vr is the value of a
participant’s home asset in round r , LOSS is the proportion of a participant’s home asset
value that is lost due to the wildfire, and INS i is the number of $LAB the participant spent
on the good “Insurance” in the round.
A factorial experimental design is used; refer to Table 2 for a summary of the
treatments. Noted in the previous section, we are interested in how the introduction of the
simulated policy of fuel treatments taking place on adjacent public land influences
participant behavior. Such a policy is simulated in the experiment by manipulating
equations (1) and (2). For treatments where mitigation has taken place on publically
owned land, N is increased by 4 to reflect simulated treatments on 4 parcels of public
land and GMIT by $LAB 60,000 to simulate $LAB 15,000 of “Mitigation” spending on
each of these 4 parcels. Additionally, we examine the influence of making participant
spending decisions publically known. In sessions implemented “With Information,”
participants can view a map on their laptops describing each other’s spending in the
previous round; this is in contrast to sessions implemented “Without Information.”
12

IV. Data Analysis
In all 22 sessions involving 244 subjects were completed, generating 2,490
decisions for analysis. The econometric analysis assumes that participant behavior with
respect to decisions over spending on wildfire risk mitigation in the experiment can be
characterized by the following model:
Spending = f (X Treatment , X Non −Treatment −Characteristics , X Attitudina l − Description , X Demographics ) (3)

where X Treatment is a vector of variables describing the treatment invoked,

X Non−Treatment−Characteristics is a vector of variables that control for differences in sessions or
rounds not attributed to changes in treatments, X Attitudina l − Descriptio n is a vector of variables
characterizing participants’ responses to a set of questions regarding risk and trust, and
X Demographi cs is a vector of demographic variables.

Success for wildfire policy can be defined in several ways. As a result, the
econometric approach uses several models. One possible policy goal is to increase the
level of wildfire risk mitigation that WUI homeowners undertake. Proponents of this goal
argue that because WUI homeowners accrue much of the benefit of wildfire risk
mitigation, policy should focus on shifting more of the corresponding financial burden of
providing these treatments to these individuals (O’Toole 2006; USDA 2006). The
variable MIT is defined as the number of lab dollars a participant allocates to the good
“Mitigation” in a round and is used as the dependent variable in the first of the estimated
models. The spending of participant i on MIT is modeled as follows:

MITi = α + βX Treatment + βX Demographics + βX Attitudinal − Description
+ βX Non −Treatment −Characteristics + ei ,t
13

(4)

where α represents an intercept term, β represents the estimated coefficients
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and ei ,t is an error term.
Another perspective is that the policy objective should be more general, and that
alongside increasing mitigation spending should be the goal of increasing private
spending on insurance. Though insurance does not speak to the externality aspects of
wildfire risk, insurance has obvious benefits at an individual level and public benefits
insofar as homeowners with adequate insurance coverage from private markets are less
likely to require public assistance in the event of a disaster. The variables INSURANCE
and TOTAL are created to reflect this possible goal. INSURANCE is the number of lab
dollars a participant allocates to the good “Insurance” in a round and TOTAL is defined
as the sum of INSURANCE and MIT within a round. The spending of participant i on
TOTAL is modeled with equation (5):
TOTALi = α + β X Treatment + βX Demographics + β X Attitudinal − Description
+ βX Non −Treatment −Characteristics + ei ,t

(5)

where again α represents an intercept term, β represents the estimable coefficients
corresponding to the vectors of explanatory variables, and ei ,t is an error term.
Finally, increasing the number of homeowners that undertake mitigation is an
additional potential policy goal. The variable MITDV is created to evaluate this
objective. MITDV is a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant undertakes some
mitigation and 0 otherwise. Defining X as the groups of variables introduced above
in X Treatment , X Demographi cs , X Attitudinal _ Description , and X Non −Treatment _ Session _ Characteri stics , and Φ as
the standard normal cumulative distribution,7 the decision of whether to allocate any lab
dollars to “Mitigation” is analyzed with random effects probit modeling (6):
14

Pr (MITDVi = 1 X ) = Φ ( Xβ )

(6)

For each model, multiple observations are taken from the same session. A concern
is that the error terms for such observations are not independent. As a result, random
effects modeling is used to analyze the data for each of the three models presented here.
By using three models that differ in dependent variables but are similar in the sets of
regressors included in the specifications presented here, a framework is constructed to
examine the impact of potential policy tools on a varied set of possible objectives.
Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in the modeling and descriptive
statistics. The vector X Treatment is made up of a set of dummy variables that distinguish the
sessions by the policy regime implemented. Table 2 provides descriptions of the
treatments implemented in the experiment. Both of the policy tools are implemented in
the experiment in two ways: once “with information” where participants have access to a
map on the screen that provides a description of all participants’ mitigation spending in
the previous round, and once “without information,” where participants’ mitigation
spending decisions are kept private.8
Used for comparison against treatments where explicit policy tools are
implemented, two variables designate the baseline case where no policy is invoked.
BASEWO and BASEW are dummy variables coded as 1 where no policy tool is
implemented (without and with information, respectively), and 0 otherwise.
The variable PL_TREATED_WO and PL_TREATED_W are dummy variables
coded as 1 for sessions where the experimenter has simulated mitigation taking place on
the public land (without and with information, respectively) and 0 otherwise.9
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The expectation is that simulated policies of wildfire risk mitigation on public
land will increase risk-mitigating behavior in the experiment. That is, each of the three
measures of success introduced above (the level of spending on mitigation, the level of
total protective spending, and the probability that a participant engages in mitigation) are
expected to be positively influenced when these policy tools are enacted. Tested against
the null hypotheses of no statistically significant influence are the alternative hypotheses
that the treatments increase spending on risk mitigation relative to the baseline treatment:
H1: β PL _ TREATED _ WO > 0
H2: β PL _ TREATED _ W > 0
The influence of an additional policy tool is considered. Noted earlier, fuel
treatments on public land have in some instances been conditional on the commitment
exhibited to the problem on surrounding private lands (Prante et al. 2007). An example is
the community collaboration requirements of cost-share programs for treating public
lands in the federal Collaborative Forest Restoration Program (CFRP) in New Mexico
(Prante et al. 2007). The variables POSSIBLE_PLT_WO and POSSIBLE_PLT_W are
created to analyze the effectiveness making fuel treatment on public land contingent upon
a threshold of private participation. The dummy variables POSSIBLE_PLT_WO and
POSSIBLE_PLT_W are coded as 1 for treatments where the public land in the
experiment is treated only if six or more participants undertake mitigation in the previous
round (without and with information, respectively). Compared against the null of no
statistically significant effect, the following hypotheses are tested to analyze the influence
of these treatments:
H3: β POSSIBLE _ PLT _ WO > 0
16

H4: β POSSIBLE _ PLT _ LW > 0
Transitioning to the control variables, the vector X Non−Treatment−Characteristics is a set of
variables that distinguish session or round characteristics. The variable ROUND_INC is
defined as the number of lab dollars a participant receives at the outset of each round to
allocate between “Mitigation,” “Insurance,” and “Savings.” The variable WEALTH is
defined as the sum of a participant’s “Savings” through the current completed round.
Within a session, the time elapsed since a wildfire occurred varies by round and has the
potential to influence behavior. The variable FIREPREV is a dummy variable coded as 1
if a fire occurred in the previous round, 0 otherwise.10 The final two variables included in
this category measure the level of interaction a participant exhibits with the software.
DIAGRAM is a dummy variable coded as 1 where a participant decided to view a map
that provided a more detailed description of the allocation decisions of others than is
presented, and 0 otherwise. The variable SLIDER is a dummy coded as 1 if a participant
adjusted the slider corresponding to group “Mitigation” to evaluate how the probability
and severity of wildfire change with group spending on “Mitigation” and 0 otherwise.
The vector X Attitudina l − Descriptio n is made up of variables that capture differences in
participant responses to a set of questions after the experiment. Because participants are
asked to make decisions that impact probabilities of an uncertain payoff, it is especially
important to control for risk preferences. To this end, subjects participated in a widely
used risk preference elicitation task (Holt and Laury 2002). In this task, each made a
series of choices between two payoff options, one providing a lower payoff with certainty
and the other providing either a higher payoff or nothing at varying probabilities. The
behavior of interest is at the point where the probability of getting the higher payoff
17

increases such that a participant switches from preferring the sure payoff to the gamble.
Using observed choices in this task as a measure of risk preferences, a dummy variable
was constructed to sort participants by risk aversion. RISKAV is a dummy variable coded
as 1 if a participant displayed risk-averse preferences in the risk elicitation task, and 0
otherwise.11 Results from this elicitation task are revealed after the wildfire experiment.
In addition to controlling for risk preferences, X Attitudina l − Descriptio n also includes a
variable that controls for participants’ beliefs regarding social capital. The General Social
Survey (GSS) is an extensive survey with the objective of collecting data to monitor and
characterize trends in American culture.12 While the GSS has been used in addressing a
variety of social science questions, it is increasingly being used in economics analyses
involving collective action (Karlan 2005). An index created from responses to a question
from the GSS is used here as a proxy for social capital. The question put to participants
was the GSS trust question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 13 Participants select one
of six responses to the question that best describes their beliefs. A set of dummy variables
has been created here to correspond with these responses. The variable TRUST is a
dummy coded as 1 where a participant selects the option most consistent with well
developed social capital (“Most people can be trusted”). The dummy variable NTRUST
is coded as 1 where a participant selects the response most consistent with a lack of social
capital (“You can’t be too careful”). These two variables are summed to construct a trust
index. The variable T_INDEX is defined as TRUST-NTRUST, so that the variable takes
the value of a 1 for trusting participants, -1 for non-trusting participants, and 0 if the
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participant selected any of the other possible responses to the trust question (“It
Depends,” “Don’t Know,” “No Answer,” or “Not Applicable”).
To evaluate the relationship between social capital (as measured by trust) and
mitigation decisions, Hypothesis 5 is:
H5: βT _ INDEX > 0
The vector X Demographi cs includes a set of control variables. Participants report
demographic information at the conclusion of the experiment. FEMALE is a dummy
coded as 1 if a participant identifies themselves as female, 0 otherwise. AGE is the age in
years of the participant. The variable EDUCATION is the number of years of formal
education.14 Not to be confused with their income earned in the experiment, the variable
ANNUAL_INC is defined as a participant’s annual income.15 HOMEOWNER is a
dummy coded as 1 where a participant owns their home, 0 otherwise. X Demographi cs
includes dummy variables that control for political party affiliation. DEMOCRAT and
REPUBLICAN are dummy variables coded as 1 for membership in the identified party
and 0 otherwise, and OTHERPARTY is a dummy coded as 1 for participants that do not
identify their political party as Democrat or Republican, and 0 otherwise.

V. Econometric Results
The discussion of the econometric results is organized by the dependent variable
analyzed. Thus the influence of treating publically owned land on the likelihood of a
participant undertaking risk mitigation (Models 1A and 1B), the amount participants
spend on risk mitigation (Models 2A and 2B), and the amount participants spend on
mitigation and insurance summed (Models 3A and 3B) is presented in turn. Estimation
19

results are presented in Table 3. Trimmed and an extended specifications presented for
each of the three dependent variables used (MITDV, MIT and TOTAL). Additional
specifications were also evaluated, with results qualitatively consistent with the
modeling presented here (available upon request). A Hausman test is used to assess the
appropriateness of using random effects modeling. For the extended specification using
the dependent variable MIT (Model 2B), the chi-squared test statistic is -34.44, indicating
that the estimated coefficients in the random effects model are statistically similar to the
coefficients from a fixed effects model (known to produce consistent estimates).
Beginning first with Models 1A and 1B, the effectiveness of fuel treatments on
publically owned lands to increase the probability that a participant undertakes private
risk mitigation is mixed. The estimated coefficients for the variables PL_TREATED_WO
and POSSIBLE_PLT_WO are positive but statistically significant for only one
specification. This implies that when fuel treatments are simulated on publically owned
lands and participant spending is kept private, subjects are not more likely to undertake
risk mitigation than in the baseline session. Similarly, the statistically insignificant
coefficients for BASE_W indicate that making subject spending public alone did not
increase the probability of mitigation. However, simulating fuel treatments on publically
owned lands is effective when participant spending is made public. The estimated
coefficients for PL_TREATED_W and POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and statistically
significant in 3 of 4 specifications presented. The results therefore suggest that to
effectively increase the likelihood of a homeowner engaging in risk mitigation, fuel
treatments should be provided in conjunction with information dissemination. The
estimated coefficient for T_INDEX is not statistically significant for this set of models.
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The marginal effects presented in brackets in Table 3 show the change in
probability of undertaking risk mitigation as the variable of interest changes from 0 to 1.
Marginal effects for this model are calculated as:
∧
∧
⎞
⎛
ME = β P⎜1 − P ⎟
⎠
⎝

(7)

The marginal effects for PL_TREATED_WO and PL_TREATED_W in the
extended specification are relatively large, 0.06 and 0.11 respectively.
Of the control variables, the estimated coefficients for WEALTH and AGE are
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that participants that have allocated more
to “Savings” in previous rounds and older are less likely to undertake risk mitigation. The
estimated coefficient for FEMALE is positive and significant indicating that female
participants are more likely to undertake mitigation than the base case (males). The
coefficients for the remaining control variables are not statistically significant.
As with the results discussed above, the impact of simulated fuel treatments on
the level of participant spending is influenced by whether participants are information
describing one another’s spending. Shown in Models 2A and 2B, the negative and
significant coefficients for PL_TREATED_WO and POSSIBLE_PLT_WO (negative but
not significant in the trimmed specification) suggest that spending on fuel treatments
taking place on publically owned land is replacing private spending. As observed
elsewhere (McKee et al. 2004; Berrens et al. 2007), subjects in these sessions spent less
on risk mitigation than their counterparts in baseline sessions. Significantly though,
disseminating information ameliorates the crowding out. The estimated coefficients for
PL_TREATED_W are not statistically significant. This suggests that the addition of
information dissemination mutes the negative influence observed in the
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PL_TREATED_WO sessions. Further, the estimated coefficients for
POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and statistically significant. The behavior observed here
therefore suggests that information dissemination combined with a policy of making fuel
treatments on publically owned lands contingent on private spending can successfully
induce private risk mitigation. There is a positive and statistically significant coefficient
for T_INDEX, indicating that participants that are more trusting spend more on risk
mitigation than their counterparts.
Of the control variables included in Models 2A and 2B, the estimated coefficients
for WEALTH, RISKAV, AGE, and FEMALE are negative and significant. The
estimated coefficients for DIAGRAM, SLIDER, T_INDEX, HOMEOWNER, and
REPUBLICAN are positive and significant. The coefficients for the remaining control
variables are not statistically significant for this set of models.
In the experiment, fuel treatments on publically owned lands influence mitigation
spending and total protective spending (sum of mitigation and insurance spending)
similarly.16 In Models 3A and 3B, estimated coefficients for PL_TREATED_WO and
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO are negative and statistically significant in 3 of 4 models. This
indicates that the policy tool has reduced private spending. However, when information is
provided in conjunction with fuel treatments on public lands, this crowding out is
ameliorated. Estimated coefficients for POSSIBLE_PLT_W are positive and significant,
indicating that participants undertook more total protective spending when this policy
was implemented. As before, the negative and significant coefficient for BASE_W
suggests that it is the combination of fuel treatments and information dissemination,
rather than fuel treatments or information alone that generates increased mitigation
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spending. Participants that are more trusting spend higher amounts on mitigation and
insurance in sum as shown by the significant positive coefficient for T_INDEX.
Of the control variables in Model 3B, the estimated coefficients for
ROUND_INC, FIREPREV, DIAGRAM, T_INDEX, and REPUBLICAN are positive
and statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for WEALTH, RISKAV,
FEMALE, and EDUCATION are negative and significant. The coefficients for all other
variables are not statistically distinct from zero in these models.

VI. Discussion and Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of providing fuel
treatments on adjacent publicly-owned lands at increasing private spending on wildfire
risk mitigation. A computerized financial experiment is created where incentives for
participants broadly parallels the incentives of WUI homeowners. Using the observed
decisions of participants as a policy guidepost, several observations stand out.
Results provide further evidence that policy tools intending to induce WUI
homeowners to engage in risk mitigation have the potential to reduce private spending.
This effect is identified both for treatments that simulate risk mitigation taking place on
public lands irrespective of private behavior and for treatments that offer risk mitigation
on public lands conditional upon a sufficient number of individuals undertaking private
risk mitigation. Thus, the results suggest that particular care should be taken in policy
design to avoid crowding out and reducing private spending on risk mitigation.
The results indentify a specific antidote for this unintended effect: disseminating
particular information on the behavior of others sharing the same risk externality.
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Behavior in the experiment is influenced by both simulated fuel treatments on public land
as well as information provision. Robust across multiple models and specifications, we
find that when implemented alongside a policy of fuel treatments on public lands,
providing participants with information describing each other’s mitigation decisions
dampens the degree to which private spending is reduced. Further, when this information
is provided along with a policy regime of providing fuel treatments on public lands only
if there is sufficient number of individuals engaging in risk mitigation, participants

increase their spending on wildfire risk mitigation.
Because programs like New Mexico’s federal Collaborative Forest Restoration
Program (CFRP) [and by inference the newly-initiated, national-level Forest Landscape
Restoration Program (FLRP)] are costly to implement relative to standard fuels reduction
efforts, whether they generate spillover mitigation on adjacent private lands is an
important consideration. That is, adding collaboration, and community-capacity building
requirements to fuels reduction projects (or funding opportunities) increases project costs,
but may generate important spillover benefits. Shepherd et al. (2009) provide recent
evidence that relative to other National Fire Plan fuels reduction projects, CFRP projects
in New Mexico exhibit significantly improved social equity effects by better targeting
poor communities, with no identifiable loss in risk targeting. This supports the potential
of such programs to induce increased private mitigation. However, given that participants
in the experiment increase mitigation spending only when information is disseminated in
conjunction with providing fuel treatments on public lands that are conditional on private
participation, we find both that both aspects of the policy prescription are important.
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Providing fuel treatments on publicly-owned lands has a disparate influence on
seemingly similar measures of mitigating behavior. This can be observed in the results
from sessions where fuel treatments took place without information dissemination
(PL_TREATED_WO). Here, the policy tool increases the probability that a participant
will undertake some mitigation but decreases the level of spending on mitigation. It is
therefore possible to increase the number individuals engaging in wildfire risk mitigation
(e.g., possibly through a demonstration effect) while at the same time decreasing the total
level of mitigation (e.g., a possible crowding out effect).. Given the spatial complexities
of wildfire risk, it is not obvious whether the negative impact of decreased aggregate
expenditures outweighs the positive impact of more people mitigating. Results suggest
that policymakers may have to prioritize among policy objectives, weighing the potential
gains associated with more individuals undertaking wildfire risk mitigation with costs
associated with a reduction in the total level of risk mitigation that takes place.
Finally, the importance of information dissemination in observed mitigation
decisions underscores the idea that social factors are critical in analyzing the “Mitigation
Paradox.” It has been suggested that developing social capital in forest communities is a
worthwhile goal of policy, insofar as increased social capital can lead to increased levels
of participation and/or private spending on wildfire risk mitigation. Again, this idea
appears to be at least part of the motivation behind community forestry-based cost-share
programs (e.g., CFRP and FLRP). The observed behavior here that higher levels of trust
are a positive determinant of mitigation spending suggests that developing social capital
is a worthwhile endeavor for policy.
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (N=2,490).
Variable
Description
MIT
The number of lab dollars ($LAB) a participant
spends on the good “Mitigation” in a round.
INSURANCE
The number of lab dollars ($LAB) a participant
spends on the good “Insurance” in a round.
TOTAL
Sum of the number of lab dollars a participant
spends on total risk reduction for both goods
“Mitigation” and “Insurance” in a round.
MITDV
Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant spends
at least 1 lab dollar on the good “Mitigation” in a
round, 0 otherwise.
BASE_WO
Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where no
policy tool is implemented and subjects are not
provided information describing the spending of
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.
BASE_W
Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where no
policy tool is implemented and subjects are
provided information describing the spending of
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise
PL_TREATED_WO
Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where the
public land has been treated and subjects are not
provided information describing the spending of
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.
PL_TREATED_W
Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where the
public land has been treated and subjects are
provided information describing the spending of
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where
contingent public land is invoked and subjects are
not provided information describing the spending
of their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.
POSSIBLE_PLT_W
Dummy variable coded as 1 for sessions where
contingent public land is invoked and subjects are
provided information describing the spending of
their fellow participants, 0 otherwise.
ROUND_INC
The number of lab dollars a participant receives at
the outset of the round.
WEALTH
Sum of a participant’s “Savings” from each
completed round.
FIREPREV
Dummy variable coded as 1 if a fire occurred in
the previous round, 0 otherwise.
DIAGRAM
Dummy variable coded as 1 if during the
experiment the participant clicked on the diagram
providing more in depth information regarding the
spending pattern of the group in the previous
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Mean(SD)
2,463.11
(2,697.71)
2,486.87
(2,332.82)
4,949.98
(3,970.35)
0.86
(0.34)
0.19
(0.39)

0.19
(0.39)

0.12
(0.33)

0.17
(0.38)

0.18
(0.38)

0.14
(0.35)

13,248.81
(2,683.99)
48,281.91
(33,490.30)
0.19
(0.39)
0.24
(0.43)

SLIDER

RISKAV

TRUST

NTRUST

T_INDEX

FEMALE
AGE
EDUCATION
ANNUAL_INC
HOMEOWNER
DEMOCRAT
REPUBLICAN
OTHERPARTY

round, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable coded as 1 if during the
experiment the participant adjusted the slider that
shows how the level of group spending changes
the impact of the good “Mitigation,” 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable coded as 1 for participant’s
whose choices in the risk aversion elicitation task
indicate risk averse preferences, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable coded as 1 for participants who
when asked the question “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?” selected the response “Most people can
be trusted,” 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable coded as 1 for participants who
when asked the question “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?” selected the response “You can’t be too
careful,” 0 otherwise.
A constructed trust index from responses to the
GSS “Trust Question.” T_INDEX=TRUSTNTRUST.
Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant is
female, 0 otherwise.
Age of a participant.

0.77
(0.42)

0.66
(0.47)
0.31
(0.46)

0.36
(0.48)

-0.05
(0.81)

0.40
(0.49)
22.27
(5.23)
Number of years of schooling a participant has
14.20
completed.
(2.45)
A participant’s annual household income ($).
32,409.64
(21,900.39)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if a participant is a
0.15
homeowner, 0 otherwise.
(0.35)
Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant’s political 0.19
party is Democrat, 0 otherwise.
(0.39)
Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant’s political 0.27
party is Republican, 0 otherwise.
(0.44)
Dummy variable coded 1 if a participant does not
0.55
identify their political party as Democrat or
(0.50)
Republican, 0 otherwise.
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Table 2. Treatment Table.
Treatment Land Treatment
name
Policy Tool

Description

T1

None

T2

None

T3

Public land is
treated

T4

Public land is
treated

T5

Public land
treated
contingent on
participation

T6

Public land
treated
contingent on
participation

Baseline, without information: No land
treatment policy tool is invoked.
Baseline, with information: No land
treatment policy tool is invoked.
For each of the four parcels of public land,
15,000 lab dollars are added to the sum of
all participants spending on “Mitigation”
in the round.
For each of the four parcels of public land,
15,000 lab dollars are added to the sum of
all participants spending on “Mitigation”
in the round.
If at least 6 participants spent at least 1 lab
dollar on “Mitigation” in the previous
round, then for each of the four parcels of
public land, 15,000 lab dollars are added to
the sum of all participants spending on
“Mitigation” in the round.
If at least 6 participants spent at least 1 lab
dollar on “Mitigation” in the previous
round, then for each of the four parcels of
public land, 15,000 lab dollars are added to
the sum of all participants spending on
“Mitigation” in the round.
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Variable Designation
Information
Describing the
Spending of other
Participants Provided
No
BASE_WO

Number
of
Sessions

Yes

BASE_W

4

No

PL_TREATED_WO

3

Yes

PL_TREATED_W

4

No

POSSIBLE_PLT_WO 4

Yes

POSSIBLE_PLT_W

4

3

Table 3. Random Effects Regression Results (N= 2,490).
Model:
1A
1B
Dependent Variable: MITDV
BASE_W
-0.16
-0.20
(-0.88)
(-0.97)
[-0.03]
[-0.04]
PL_TREATED_WO
0.25
0.39
(1.18)
(1.74)*
[0.04]
[0.06]
PL_TREATED_W
0.76
0.89
(3.68)***
(3.86)**
[0.11]
[0.11]
POSSIBLE_PLT_WO 0.29
0.33
(1.48)
(1.62)
[0.05]
[0.05]
POSSIBLE_PLT_W
0.35
0.26
(1.64)*
(1.14)
[0.06]
[0.04]
ROUND_INC
--1.69e-5
(1.00)
[0.00]
WEALTH
---8.54e-6
(-7.15)***
[-0.00]
FIREPREV
--0.01
(0.07)
[0.00]
DIAGRAM
--0.04
(-0.40)
[-0.01]
SLIDER
--0.43
(5.59)***
[0.09]

2A
2B
Dependent Variable: MIT
-888.71
-1158.49
(-1.72)*
(-6.67)***

3A
3B
Dependent Variable: TOTAL
-994.26
-1092.53
(-1.22)
(-4.73)***

-946.68
(-1.68)*

-579.01
(-3.12)***

-1997.14
(-2.26)**

-1558.30
(-6.32)***

-419.58
(-0.81)

-242.17
(-1.27)

-1167.22
(-1.43)

-822.38
(-3.22)***

-265.66
(-0.51)

-359.51
(-2.10)***

-461.10
(-0.57)

-382.23
(-1.69)*

1027.11
(1.84)*

412.56
(2.13)**

1246.90
(1.42)

715.68
(2.77)***

---

0.05
(2.23)**

---

0.15
(4.86)***

---

-0.04
(-25.87)**

---

-0.06
(-30.57)***

---

38.40
(0.29)

---

542.54
(2.91)***

---

362.09
(2.86)***

---

476.66
(2.66)***

---

366.14
(3.36)***

---

198.88
(1.29)
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RISKAV

---

-0.06
---541.73
---452.02
(-0.77)
(-5.56)***
(-3.30)***
[-0.01]
T_INDEX
--0.05
--161.56
--388.86
(1.09)
(2.76)***
(4.71)***
[0.01]
FEMALE
--0.51
---218.98
---387.66
(6.27)***
(-2.28)**
(-2.87)***
[0.08]
AGE
---0.03
---58.98
--2.08
(-4.36)***
(-5.85)***
(0.15)
[-0.01]
EDUCATION
--0.10
--11.36
---77.14
(6.26)***
(0.55)
(-2.65)***
[0.02]
HOMEOWNER
--0.16
--494.34
--37.77
(1.30)
(3.49)***
(0.34)
[0.03]
ANNUAL_INC
---2.55e-6
---1.20e-3
---2.64e-3
(-1.45)
(-0.53)
(-0.83)
[-0.00]
REPUBLICAN
--0.10
--334.40
--326.14
(0.11)
(2.96)***
(2.05)**
[0.00]
DEMOCRAT
---0.13
--122.49
--242.41
(-1.30)
(0.99)
(1.39)
[-0.02]
CONSTANT
0.94
0.17
2710.33
5020.51
5477.50
7514.90
(7.14)***
(0.45)
(7.39)***
(10.30)**
(9.51)***
(11.01)***
Log Likelihood
-943.72
-842.83
--------Wald Chi squared
----15.51***
1154.53
14.66
1505.66***
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively (two-tailed t-tests). Marginal effects presented
in brackets
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1

Cost-sharing programs and subsidization of fuel reductions on private lands have

been used widely; See USDA (2009); Available July 1, 2009 at:
http://www.wildfireprograms.usda.gov/search.html?search=index&&view=type.
2

The instructions, along with the screen images participants see throughout the

experiment are available upon request and can be viewed at
http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf.
3

Some sessions were conducted with fewer participants (10 or 11) when less than

12 were available. The econometric results are not sensitive to the number of participants.
4

There are four components to participant earnings for the experiment: the sum of

a participant’s spending on “Savings” for each round, the participant’s earnings from the
risk elicitation task, and 50% of the participant’s asset value at the conclusion of the
experiment, and a “show up” payment of five dollars. On average, the experiment lasted
one hour and 15 minutes and subjects were paid $31.87 for their participation.
5

In the experiment, the parameters used in equations (1) and (2) determine the

efficacy of a lab dollar spent on “Mitigation” to reduce risk exposure. In real world
applications, the efficacy of risk mitigating behaviors to reduce risk exposure varies as
local geographies change. The parameters used here are therefore not intended to reflect
the effectiveness of risk mitigation for all WUI applications but rather were chosen for
tractability in the experiment.
6

In addition to the “sliders,” several other steps are taken to facilitate participant

understanding. First, before the primary experiment, subjects participate in a tutorial on
the mechanics of the “sliders” (see Screen 3 in the Auxiliary materials located at
http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf. Second, two practice rounds take
36

place before participants choices are tied to payoffs. Third, there are buttons near each of
the sliders labeled “What’s this?” that participants can click on for additional explanation
about a feature of the experiment (see Screen 16 in the Auxiliary materials).
7

For completeness, the data has also been analyzed with logit probability models.

These results are similar and available if requested.
8

To see how this information is presented, refer to the Auxiliary materials

located at http://www.cwu.edu/~prantet/Wildfire_Aux_Docs.pdf.
9

This is incorporated into the equations (1) and (2) by increasing N by 4, to

reflect simulated treatments on 4 parcels of public land and GMIT by $LAB 60,000 to
simulate $LAB 15,000 of “Mitigation” spending on each of these 4 parcels.
10
11

The variable FIREPREV is coded as 0 for the first round of the session.
Risk averse preferences are defined here as preferring the uncertain payoff only

once the probability of receiving the higher payoff reached 0.6.
12

This description of the GSS, and additional information describing the GSS is

available at: http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website, accessed April 30, 2008.
13

Not presented here, alternative modeling included two additional GSS questions:

the helpful question, “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” and the fairness question, “Do you
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would
they try to be fair?” Results on these variables were not statistically significant.
14

For both AGE and EDUCATION, several respondents did not respond. The mean

age and education level for all participants was used for these observations

37

15

Participant’s reported income by indicating which among 10 categories described

their income group. To reduce the expanding number of indicator variables used, these
responses were converted to continuous data by entering for each observation the
midpoint from its respective income category. As with AGE and EDUCATION, nonresponses were replaced with the mean income.
16

Given similarities in the experimental goods considered, the potential exists for

the policy tools to influence the proportion of total spending characterized as mitigation.
Participants may shift spending between insurance and mitigation in response to
changing policy regimes. An additional set of log-odds models (similar to Talberth et al.
2006) was used to examine the influence of each policy tool on the proportion of total
spending directed to mitigation. The estimated coefficients for each policy tools are for
the most part not statistically significant. These results are available upon request
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